Culture, Society, and Praxis
Volume 7
Number 2 Culture, Economy, and Change

Article 6

January 2008

Why Professors Hate Their Jobs: A Critique of the Pedagogy of
Academic Disengagement
Jim Parsons
University of Alberta

William Frick
University of Oklahoma

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/csp

Recommended Citation
Parsons, Jim and Frick, William (2008) "Why Professors Hate Their Jobs: A Critique of the Pedagogy of
Academic Disengagement," Culture, Society, and Praxis: Vol. 7 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/csp/vol7/iss2/6

This Praxis and Analysis / Praxis y Análisis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at
Digital Commons @ CSUMB. It has been accepted for inclusion in Culture, Society, and Praxis by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ CSUMB. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@csumb.edu.

Parsons and Frick: Why Professors Hate Their Jobs: A Critique of the Pedagogy of Aca

30

Why Professors Hate Their Jobs

CS&P

Why Professors Hate Their Jobs: A Critique of the Pedagogy of Academic Disengagement
By Jim Parsons, William Frick
Summary
This co- author article discusses the disengagement that exists between today’s professors and their students in the classroom. This article in particular really took an
interactive approach by including our journals reviewer’s comments, which adds for
a great dynamic of communication between college students and professors in the
academic world.
Introduction
Recently, a PhD student from the University
of Alberta completed a dissertation about the
lives of professors. Her findings? We are a
deeply unhappy group; specifically, we hate
our jobs. She was shocked. Dreaming of an
academic position of her
own, and seeing the completion of her doctoral dissertation as one of the final steps
of this dream, she thought
that her dreams would be
shared by her soon-to-be colleagues. But, of the professors she interviewed, only two
said they liked being an academic. Most felt caught,
trapped, unappreciated, and
powerless to find joy for their
spirits. Her interviews were
filled with commentary about
academic life that offered little hope and much
despair. In fact, deep regret and cynicism pervaded these conversations. Her participants
felt caught and had little idea how to get uncaught. Her findings, if they are to be trusted,
suggest that we are a hope-less lot, deeply
cynical, feeling broken and battered. Perhaps
most sad, we don’t know how to make our

lives better; and, we feel like there is no time
to get off the treadmill and try (Erfani, 2006).
Perhaps our young colleague created an aberration, but we think not. Our own experiences, coupled with wide conversations with
our colleagues, suggest she accidentally found
a flaw in our armor and an illness in our spirits. We feel it around us, and
we also fear we are less than
adequately prepared to fend
off this erosion to our own
immune systems. Although
we have few answers, we
hope this article, in a naïve
way, might engender a conversation about this topic as a
way of engaging the specter
directly. Our work together is
an attempt to find a process
that, by its nature, addresses
some of the issues we will
raise. In addition to dialoguing with each other as we have engaged
this work, our work has been shared with reviewers engaged in the adjudication of articles
for this journal. The reviewers’ comments, in
themselves, represent additional conversations
generated by colleagues interested in this topic. Specifically, in addition to necessary critique of our ideas, these reviewers suggested
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additional readings they believed would add to
our knowledge; and, in our “academic negotiations” towards publication of our ideas in an
article for this journal, we have used their suggestions and insights to push our work further.
At its basic level, our work together as writers
and reviewers is one communicative aspect of
academic journals – a conversation between
working colleagues. In light of this focus on
engendering a conversation around the current
state of the professorship, we have chosen to
include some reviewer comments within the
article as a way to collectively engage the
specter we sense so deeply within ourselves.
Before we begin, we hope to outline our task
transparently. Because we are working toward
understanding through communication, we
will use Habermas’ (1984) four kinds of
claims to validity as our guide. Habermas
notes that presenters must (a) present something
understandable
(semantics
and
grammar); (b) give the hearer something to
understand [speak the truth about a situation
external to both us (speakers) and you (hearers)]; (c) make oneself thereby understandable
(make our claims to truthfulness so as we become trustworthy); and (d) come to an understanding with another person (a claim for
“normative rightness” by choosing something
that fits within the framework of social norms
forming the background to the interpersonal
situation). This fourth claim to validity seems
particularly powerful to us, because by its enacting we are attempting in our small way to
work towards a solution to the problem of
which we speak. And, here is the cart before
the horse. Basically, we believe that the best
way to overcome what we see as a culture of
disengagement is to engage with each other
socially and truthfully about it.
This article is an attempt to explore what we
see as a sad state of affairs. What seems
doubly sad to us is the irony of it all: the jobs
we have are the jobs we aspired for, and this is
the work we hoped would be both intellectually and socially stimulating. Why we should
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come to despair in this work is worth considering publicly. Certainly, there are pragmatic
reasons: most of us find ourselves in direct
collegial competition for what seem like finite
resources – research monies and yearly increments. Plus, the work can be difficult and
lonely (no one we know evaluates and critiques students’ work at the pub as a social
event), and the will wanes. There is the
drudgery of grading the same paper dozens of
times. In the lonely spirit of Don Juan, our
writing and research articles can seem like so
much piecework – a sort of Dickens’ morality
drama where we feel we are dragging more
chains than Jacob Marley.
We noted that our thinking (on paper) is
both nascent (to us) and quite possibly naïve
in the appraisal of others, and we our colleagues have told us so. But we wish things
were different, and we hope beginning this
discussion might be a forum to help. Here is
our hope: we believe underneath the surface of
these dis-eased activities are deeper afflictions
– one that a hopeful pedagogy might help. We
are going to, in this article, theorize that we
are living in a world (the academy) – which is,
in fact, a logical system where the current
activities and the beliefs of academics are both
symptomatic and expressive of a pedagogy
and a philosophical culture that centers on the
politics of disengagement and leaves academics on the whole with an overwhelming angst
that approaches nihilism – where there is nothing to act upon and, even if there were, we feel
powerless to act. We will address this lack of
efficaciousness by intersecting two areas of inquiry and practice: pedagogy and philosophy.
An Apologetic about Pedagogy
We believe we have been schooled into this
culture of disengagement and we seem to believe the desks are fixed to the floor. We use
the concept “pedagogy” to explain this culture
because we believe it has been a part of our
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schooling – it has been leading us. And, we
will contrast a pedagogy of disengagement
with another pedagogy we will call a pedagogy of engagement. We understand these
concepts to be both simple and perhaps provocative. Yet, we hope that our simplistic and
exploratory article might help to engender a
deeper conversation about the lives we live in
the academy. Should we be able to begin this
conversation, we believe that we will have
moved a step toward engendering a healing
missive that might help us thoughtfully attend
to our own positive ends. We are also reminded that pedagogy can be understood in a
variety of ways – from public policy discourse
that contains particular ideological perspectives designed to influence popular opinion to
institutional and organizational practices and
structures that serve educative purposes and,
by doing so, socialize and normalize participants.
In our attempt to question fundamental assumptions, we trust Alfred North Whitehead
(1925) who, in Science and the Modern
World, noted that those who critique a culture
should not attend to intellectual positions that
historians feel it necessary explicitly to defend. More important for a deep understanding
of a culture are those fundamental assumptions that adherents of the systems unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear
so obvious that people do not know what they
are assuming. Indeed, they do not know they
are assuming anything because no other way
of putting things has ever occurred to them. In
this article, we are trying to put things “another way” so that we might come to understand
the culture of the academy as a world of myth,
hegemony, and conflict.
The world of the academy is a “secondary
world,” in the sense that the Middle Earth is,
for Tolkien, a secondary world. It is a mythopoeia. The sine qua non of creating myths is
that a world can resemble another world, but
not really be that other world – a world
mirrored through the looking glass. And, in
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2
Published by Digital Commons @ CSUMB, 2008

many ways, for those of us who live there, the
academy is the academy and the rest (the nonacademy) is the Muggle world. There is a
clearly demarcated wholeness to the academy
– it possesses an internal logic and self-consistency. It has its own peculiar rules that
shape the lives of those who live and work
there; and, it is these rules we are attempting
to critique because we believe these rules are
growing toxic to its inhabitants. Perhaps, to
extend the metaphor, we are writing this article as a self-defense against the Dark Arts.
Contrasting Pedagogies
There are Jeremiads1 and there are invitations to act differently. We hope ours is the
latter. Invitations to act differently come in all
cultures. Islam is short on theology and long
on practice, believing for example that prostrating one’s self and giving alms will habituate edifying patterns of actions towards others.
The story of the first Christmas, angels announced the birth of the “Child” and, by doing
so, invited humans to a responsibility to live
differently. This same onus is alluded to in the
Japanese expression of thank you – which
translated means, almost literally “it is a heavy
weight you give to me.” We feel a similar
need to create an enabling myth that calls academics to participate in some disruptively positive changes to our prevailing culture.
We are calling for all of us to work through,
as Pope John Paul II calls it, a “philosophy of
action.” This philosophy of action obliges us
to create and express a vision for a pedagogy
of engagement. The vision demands something of us, as teachers and academics, and attests to the moral courage required to understand our work as precondition, means, and
1

A Jeremiad is a long literary work (almost as long
as Freddie Mercury’s “Bohemian Rhapsody”), prose
or poetry, in which the author laments the state of society and its morals in a serious tone of sustained invective. Usually, the work contains a prophecy of society's imminent downfall. We aspire through our
missive to be more hopeful.
Fall 2008
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end to a fulfillment of human purpose. To help
us define this pedagogy of engagement, we
ask this guiding question: What are people
for? And, we answer that, to us, there is no
mystery: We are for each other in community
(Berry, 1990).
To help a reader understand what we mean
by the concept pedagogy of engagement, we
contrast our idea with what we will call a
“pedagogy of disengagement.” In their simplicity, these phrases appear to us to represent
distinct paradigms and, as ideas, become helpful to deconstruct the tenets of individual
philosophical positions about the nature of
teaching and the corresponding purposes of an
academic life. What is the goal of teaching?
Our answer is that teaching is a way of life
based in community (teachers and students together) and invokes a pedagogy based on relational sharing rather than hierarchical (or
status-imbued) pronouncing. The end is a holistic shared life in community; it is not the rescue of students from ignorance. Teaching
finds its full meaning in a community of relationship, reconciliation, and justice. And as
the reviewers of this article have made clear,
justice is an elusive idea. We acknowledge
this insight, especially as it pertains to the
teaching context. Although we speak of justice
(and injustice), we are guided by notions of
justice as emancipation, not only for our students but for ourselves. This notion of justice
as emancipation will hopefully be evident to
the reader.
Education and Schooling
Paulo Freire (2007) would tell us that teaching, in addition to sharing, is a vocational opportunity to raise critical consciousness for the
learner. The teacher, in community with others, practices so as to mobilize persons, to free
persons from domination and oppression – to
set learners on a different life-course because
of newly-acquired thinking, attitudes, skills
and dispositions. Teaching, then, finds its full
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meaning in a community of liberated (broadly
construed) persons who have dedicated themselves to reconciliation, justice (broadly construed), discourse, mutual dependence, collective interests beyond the limited parameters
of individual and/or collective identity, and
peace. And peace, as Howard John Loewen
(1985) tells us, is a transformational grammar.
That we would place so much importance on
how we educate each other might seem odd,
but as Hodgkinson (1991) tells us, “Education
is something very special in the field of human affairs” (p.15). Assuming a constellation
of purposes and instilled with idealistic faith,
“education has about it a…humanistic quality
which renders it distinctive and special among
the occupations of [humanity]” (Hodgkinson,
1991, p. 23). The purposes of education and
schooling as a formal institution in particular,
are rooted in human desires and values. As an
institution, schooling “seeks to serve…its clientele by altering the world in such a way as
to realize those values” (p. 26) and, as such,
education broadly conceived, formal schooling in general, and teaching in particular becomes a humanistic, idealistic, and moral pursuit.
Schooling is special (unique) because, compared to other social institutions that exist to
ensure a primary purpose rooted in value,
schooling encompasses a constellation of humanistic values ranging from aesthetic happiness, to ideological transmission, to instrumental economic gain. Education is, in one
sense, “the most general human pursuit”
(Hodgkinson, 1991, p. 27) centering its work
on the basic value of fulfillment, and itself a
precondition to the fulfillment of other human
purposes. “It is this all-inclusive quality that
makes education so special” and posits it with
a relevance to all aspects of the human condition (Hodgkinson, 1991, p, 27).
By way of schooling, students are inducted
into the beliefs, values, customs, and cultural
tools of our particular society; depend upon it
for their economic livelihood; and acquire
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from it appreciations and sentiments that contribute to our quality of life. The endeavor is
profoundly moral. Hence, because the enterprise is so special, or uniquely moral, teaching
and leading for the enterprise is special as
well. It is a “moral art” (Hodkinson, 1991).
Differences between Pedagogies of Engagement and Pedagogies of Disengagement
The distinction between these pedagogies rests
profoundly in one simple critique: how do we
treat others? Note that others are always implied in our critique. To us, education is a vocation that implies one’s actions with others –
in some way or form. Ergo, it is in how we engage the other(s) that defines our pedagogical
actions. That said, we associate words, characteristics, or characterological virtues such as
compassion, empathy, respect, humility, openness, and dialogue with a pedagogy of “engagement.” In dialogues of both words and actions, we associate words, characteristics, or
characterological virtues such as pity, monologue, arrogance, exclusivism, and intrusion
with a pedagogy of disengagement.
“Disengagement” assumes imposition, patronization, paternalism, and cultural arrogance
that results in ignorance (we ignore others’
needs and persons) and presumption (we presume to know and understand others’ needs
and persons). Such acts, in both cases, might
be undertaken for noble intentions. But, regardless of how well-intended the actions
might be, the “intentionality2” of the actions
creates the philosophy of how we relate to others. “Engagement” assumes dialogical possibility, active gratitude, transformation through
community (common unity), and loving emancipation.
Disengagement

2

We will discuss the difference between intentionality and acts with intention later in the article.
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2
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When we speak to our graduate students, they
seem to have few complaints; and, when we
recall our own graduate education, we recall
caring mentors and supervisors. That said,
when we look back at what happens to our
students and what happened to us (the totality
of our experience), we see that something else
has also concomitantly occurred; we learned
to accept the world of the academy as “normal” and to fit into our tasks there without critique – without a sense of this culture having
the potential for domination. We will explicate
this culture more specifically later; suffice it to
say, we believe a pedagogy of disengagement
has sharply increased recently based in large
part upon an institutional culture of domination.
When Jim, who has been an academic staff
member at the University of Alberta since
1976, speaks with his aging colleagues at the
University of Alberta, they often fall into
“Camelot talk,” recalling the glory days of
their Department and reveling in how things
“used to be3” and, of course, are no longer.
And, there is honesty in this talk – things are
less collegial now than they were 30+ years
ago4. We believe that the difference lies in the
3

It was not uncommon, in the mid-1970s to all have
coffee together twice a day – 10:30 am and 2:30 pm.
When one person moved, almost every young professor met to help. Weekends were spent together in
families. Christmas parties of whole Departments
were held in rented halls with 300+ attendees, with
singing and comedy and talent shows. Obviously,
other things have occurred to change these social
communities; but, we attest that some of the things
that have happened to reshape these events and this
convivial attitude have to do with things outside of
society’s sociological occurrences. We believe some
things are systemic – competition for what seem like
finite research dollars; strong personal competition
for salary and promotion; and an academic culture
driven by less than convivial philosophical groundings – and the things that go with that [such as a personal lack of efficacy and fullness that makes us,
shall we say, edgy (on edge)].
4
We do, however, believe that those graduate student
supervisors who acted in ways characterized by the
old idea are no longer in the main. The saying was, at
Fall 2008
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relationship between colleagues and the relationship between being an academic and the
tasks of teaching, research, and other knowledge-building activities.
A dichotomy of life is characterized in
graduate school education (learning and teaching). One can become a scholar and, at the
same time, become a “true believer” in the
culture; one can learn from research5, and can
learn to be a researcher - including the hierarchical rules that place one over others –
competition for publication in the “right”
journals, acceptance of a finite amount of material resources (competition for funding),
competition for salary increments and promotion based upon “productivity” – all can become clearly conformed to a paradigm of disengagement. Now we talk about our “heroes”
by noting that “she was published in that
journal” or “he just received a huge research
award.” These are our icons; but, is their work
edifying anyone – including themselves? Two
cases in point: (1) conversations with colleagues, especially throughout the US, note
the difficulty of gaining tenure and a common
(n of a few) theme – “I worked so hard to gain
tenure, and after I got it I quit working” and
(2) a “confession” (although meant as sound
strategy) from an icon, who stated “I try,
every two years, to get one article published in
….(enter the name of an important journal
here). That is the only article I write. I could
publish more, but I know the game. I quit doing research I was interested in and started to
figure out a year ahead what topic would be
‘hot’.” To us, this person seems more sad than
least at the University of Texas, “The first paper the
graduate student publishes contains the name of the
supervisor only; the second paper has the supervisor’s name as main author and the graduate student as
second author; the third has the graduate student as
main author with the supervisor second; and, finally,
the fourth paper contains only the graduate student’s
name as single author.
5
It is profound how deeply philosophical research
foundations can lead us – engaging notions of epistemology, axiology, and ontology. There is a lifetime of work explicating this area.
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happy – strategy has replaced the joy of discovery and creation. Are we teaching our
graduate students to thrive in a pedagogy of
disengagement and, perhaps more disturbing,
to accept and believe this is the way academic
life should be lived6?
The disengagement of which we speak takes
many forms. For example, in our own institutions it would be hard to argue against the
growth in self-assertion, self-protection, formational separations, isolation, alienation, selfrepression of thought, lack of space and time
to engage in shared ideas, and lack of agency
directed toward impulses toward community.
We see a self-centered core as a basis of our
human activities and the organizational politics writ individually on human actions. For
example, it is not uncommon to hear honestly
thoughtful professors strategizing to “capture”
for them what seem like finite resources and
rewards – as manifested in research grants and
annual increments toward salary. A first-year
education professor recently noted recently he
had declined a chance to work with teachers in
schools because his job was to “think and
write theoretically, and engage in his own theoretical research” – which he implied was research done while being sequestered on campus, clearly outside the more common (vulgar)
activities of teachers and students in schools.
Or, at a recent presentation, a first-year professor critiqued her student teacher for not being able to see the systemic and structural inequities present in the classroom and for only
wishing to engage in conversation about the
student teacher evaluation. The professor’s
critique was based upon a theoretical frame6

Pope John Paul II would probably suggest that the
antipathy here would stem from people choosing
lower values over higher values. His philosophical
work outlining values hierarchies suggests that lower
values (such as materialism) are finite and conflicts
over these lower values exist, in part, because of their
finite nature. If I get this resource, you cannot. On the
other hand, a higher value (such as conviviality or
community) has no limits – that is we all can enjoy as
much of it as we desire without denying that others
experience it as well.
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work which posited that meaning resided entirely in language and who failed to see she
was engaging a culture (schools) where meaning did not lie in language, but in action. We
are not arguing that this colleague was not
well-meaning. But her manner was condescending and ignored the very idea of cultures
she was engaging theoretically. She was
watching a “student teacher” (where does language live in this nouned concept?) and this
student teacher could only seem to focus on
her own performance and could not seem to
see the structural violence perpetrated on the
class by patterns of behavior. What seems
grossly unfair about this “story” is that the
colleague did not seem to recognize the system of structural blindness perpetrated by the
system of scrutiny and evaluation inherent in
how the university constructed the visit in the
first place – and the student teachers’ fatalistic
codependence upon that system: “You are sitting in my class, making notes. Now you are
sitting me down to talk seriously about me –
this must be about my performance. After all,
you were an audience to me – with the students, you faced only me, watching, noting,
and ‘judging’. Now you will talk to me, and I
know exactly the text and context of this talk –
what else could be happening here? What else
can this be but performance anxiety? Who are
you kidding that this is about whether I saw
any structural oppression of students? I was
teaching about adverbs.”
Certainly, at the same time, many of these
same thoughtful people decry hypocritical
activities of others or spend time academically
analyzing the complex adaptive nature of human and natural systems. This critique is not
“to throw the first stone” at these young professors, but instead to blame us all who have
lived in the academy. It is also to explain the
complexity of the issues that face us. We
didn’t mean for all this to happen; but something did happen rather quickly to us in the
past thirty years, and the happening is powerfully consumptive. Thus, we engage in “perCS&P Vol 7. Num 2
Published by Digital Commons @ CSUMB, 2008

sonal university” activities – though separate
from the discourse of our academic knowledge – that help build ideologies that rationalize a certain kind of poverty of spirit and a
systemic “legalism” that enforces a socioeconomic order that can, and does, entrap us.
The university is hardly a simple institution, and the academy is a complex concept7.
Both university and academy are filled with
“office,” hierarchy, rewards and punishments,
spirits and ghosts, institution, ideology, icons,
religious belief, and tradition. We encounter
these in slogans, symbols, and the ways we organize our social and our work activities.
These define and dictate the modes of our cultural patterns and relationships. They define,
for us, justice, wisdom, social values, the
meaning of humanity, the status and roles of
individuals, and the nature of our interactions.
They provide us rationalization for our social
orders. In short, they dominate because they
form a system of domination we seldom think
to challenge.
Although this system is a human construct,
it is not always a conscious human construct;
yet, it inevitably instructs us and serves as a
basis for a pedagogy of disengagement. Here,
the system as academy behaves immorally
(Niebuhr, 1932), while singular souls within it
struggle, and often fail (even of their own doing), to find another way to seek and live out a
pedagogy of engagement that ultimately leads
to hope. The systematic domination defines us
a human actors – it takes on a life, identity, set
of goals, and a dynamic all its own.
We have argued that a pedagogy of disengagement inhibits those of us who work in the
academy. The inhibitors we have seen include
(1) fatalism (no matter what is done, the end is
determined); (2) depression of spirit (an underlying discouragement about life); (3) self7

Were we further in our analysis, we would probably
be more fastidious in making sure that when we use
the term university we use it to mean the place/site of
our work, and when we use the word academy we use
it to mean the conceptual idea of that site. But, early
in our work we are not quite sure what to choose.
Fall 2008
7
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deprecation (believing oneself a loser who is
unable to function in the culture); (4) a sense
of powerlessness resulting from internalized
oppression (one comes to believe and act as if
the “oppressor’s beliefs and values express a
reality that must be lived); (5) structures and
values that have created a hegemony (we are
unable to visualize options to our actions and
lives); and, (6) self-centered fear that justifies
deceitful and manipulative behavior (if we
don’t out-produce, cheat, violate, or win over
others, we will suffer).
Engagement
We believe many of us are wounded and live
in a wounded system. We would like to suggest a different path, to take initiative in this
wounded world, and to work to reconcile its
violent, unjust, and abusive patterns. Our goal
is to introduce a life of engagement as a real
human possibility, as a truly new paradigm or
the return of an old paradigm8. This paradigm
of “enculturalization” can become the goal of
teaching. By encluturalization, we mean the
process of passing, from one generation to another generation, through formal education
and broader socialization, the chosen aspects
of a “life,” a life lived out in relation to the
learner. This process works to integrate cultural characteristics in intended or accidental
8

We once read that Immanuel Kant would nightly
dine with his graduate students, and during these
evenings talk, play games, and take walks. Regardless of what one thinks of Kant’s philosophy, he obviously had a graciousness of spirit (or, in those days,
an accommodating wife). We suspect, using the
is/ought cosmology, that these graduate students also
learned from these occasions about how life was and
should be. It is not hard, as well, to find readings
where the begetting of academics: for example, Jeffreys (2004) notes the work of Franz Brentano and
indicates that Edmund Husserl was one of Brentano’s
students who criticized and developed Brentano’s
work; Edith Stein was one of Edmund Husserl’s students, whose work was influenced by Husserl; and
that Dietrich von Hildebrand studied with Husserl,
developing his thought in important ways. The point
is that we don’t seem to live this way anymore.
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ways through prolonged socialization within
the bounds of a distinct cultural context. In
other words, we are always teaching more
than we are teaching – our systems speak as
loudly as our words. The moral enterprise then
becomes as, Louis Luzbetak’s (1963) applied
anthropology notes that, cooperation, rather
than manipulation, works to influence a society’s pattern of behavior.
The value of community – or common unity
– is shared “people-centered” activity. It is
much easier to dominate and control. When
only one voice speak, there is great external
clarity. But clarity is not the goal of teaching;
transformation, in our view, is the goal of
teaching (Mezirow, 2000). A teacher must be
“catalytic.” As chemists tell us, a catalytic
agent induces a change without confounding
or altering the molecular structure of the host
elements.
Catalysis is the process of modification or
releasing the host elements from inhibitive
structures that act as obstructions; by doing so,
ultimately but indirectly, one induces intrinsic
changes in the host elements. The “inhibitive
structures” of life are manifold, and teaching’s
highest moral pursuit is to both modify and release the learner from domination. The transformative teaching life that is engagement is
one keenly aware. As Vaclav Havel (1985)
tells us, a better system does not automatically
ensure a better life. In fact, he suggests, only
creating a better life can develop a better system. Or put differently by the patriarchs:
He has told you, O man, what is good; And
what does the Lord require of you But to do
justice, to love kindness, And to walk
humbly with your God? (Micah 6:8)
Dialogue is a method of social catalysis. First,
it is an ideal. Second, it is a relationship. Only
third is it an activity. And this activity is a
common unity open and respectful of partnership – a partnership implied by Habermas’
(1984) four claims to validity we noted earlier.
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The goal of a teacher is to help awaken the
students to possibilities within their reach.
One step is working together to eliminate unjust structures that are hegemonic within a culture, and replacing these with an alternative
consciousness. The work must be done, in the
Freirian sense, within a dialogical construct
and organization – given to extended blocks of
time. Dialogue, understood as such, becomes
the transformative tool of the fully-present
teacher. John Dewey (1938) noted that the
means contain and condition the ends. Therefore, the centrality of dialogue as means becomes the Habermasian discourse where the
moral and ethical (in part) is determined by
the interactive process between persons. As an
activity, it encourages the literacy of possibilities.
In a transformative paradigm, human intervention is indirect and vicarious. It is indirect
in the sense that we cannot go into a situation
with a set of pre-constructed solutions that we
impose on the situation. It is vicarious in the
sense that we must become partners with those
whom we would seek to serve as guides and
facilitators of dialogical space. We, as teachers, serve our students.
As servants, we must take upon ourselves
the basic cultural identity of those whom we
would serve. We must incarnate our work
with stories and cultures that our students understand. Then, we must participate together
with the goal of creating an engaged and reconciled community. Aristotle ~334-323 BCE
(1989) noted that humans are social animals
distinguished by rationality. Though philosophers through the ages have worked to discount Aristotle, in at least one sense Aristotle
is correct. Social cooperation, based on friendship and mutual self-interest, is rational – in
that it makes sense when you consider it. As
we engage the culture, and the learners within
it, we need to view it emically – from the inside – rather than imposing foreign cultural
norms and meanings from the outside as an
immediate basis of judgment. We must also
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2
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note that we are part of that culture. To put it
simply, to act vocationally as a teacher we
need a pedagogy of engagement that implies
“consideration of” the presence of others.
A Critique of Philosophy
We believe that one reason academics are unhappy is because their lives are lived embedded within philosophies that do not allow the
possibility of efficacious agency. That is, we
are critiquing those late 20th century and the
early 21st century philosophies that seem to
have captured our minds while simultaneously
chaining us to often-unexamined fundamental
values. These values grind our ethical action
to a halt. As simply as we can state it, seldom
are there ethical places to go from neither
these philosophies nor little reason to try. We
believe that at the heart of current educational
philosophies, such as some writers in complexity science and some branches of critical
theory, are the beliefs that humans are not
agents, cannot be willful in making change,
and cannot be involved in “human acts”. We
can only be involved in “actions that happen
to humans.” Agency disappears with the poststructural deconstruction of any morally imbued meta-narrative.
For example, postmodern and post-structural
thought has led to increasingly declaim ideological commitments about the value of metanarratives. Consider the ontological relationship between concepts of personal narrative
(which allow an intrinsic human telos) and
their groundings in meta-narratives. Is it possible to have personal narratives without metanarratives? How does an “actor” come to gain
a sense of purpose (divine or otherwise, and
what sense of purpose lacks divinity?) that
constitutes movement towards creating a personally meaningful human life?
There is general agreement that social and
technological changes of the 20th and now 21st
century were born of modernist temper but
paradoxically eroded key modernist assumpFall 2008
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tions, particularly those regarding personal
agency, personal value, and instrumental reason. Feminist scholars (e.g., Luepnitz, 1988)
have added their own critique of implicit paternalism that works to reestablish power hierarchies without considering disparities experienced between women and men. Many critical
philosophies have engaged extensive debates
about the nature of power hidden within accepted practices. Post-structural “life” has rejected meta-narratives on ideological grounds,
suggesting that broad understandings embraced by a culture that form inherited contexts and meanings should give way to more
particular narratives that individuals may tell
about their cultures and about themselves.
Writings by critics such as Jean-Francois
Lyotard (1979/1984) and Michel Foucault
(1980) have gone hand-in-hand with a belief
in social constructionism that questions many
established and comfortable ideas. Anderson
(1997) suggests that postmodern thought represents a broad challenge to and a cultural
shift away from fixed meta-narratives, privileged discourses, universal truths, objective
reality, language as representational, and the
scientific criterion of knowledge as objective
and fixed. Whether these are true or not true
(ironically) is not our point: instead, our point
is that these critiques are uncomfortable
spaces to live – hope and purpose is disrupted.
So, when Lyotard (1979/1984, p. xxiv)
defines the postmodern temper as “incredulity
toward metanarratives” and Foucault (White
& Epston, 1990) talks of “privileged discourses,” we are left uncomfortable in the
wake of this accusation that seems to point
directly to us. Basically we know that society
allows the ivory-towered academy (and those
of us who live there) to exist and engage in the
modernist temperament of engaging in privileged discourse. Furthermore, consider where
the postmodern narrative of “social constructionism,” as defined by the following all but
universally accepted four ideas, really puts us:
(1) realities are socially constructed; (2) realit-
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ies are constituted using language; (3) realities
are organized and maintained using narrative;
and (4) there are no essential truths. One
might be tempted to cynically ask: if there is
no essential truth and we are left to socially
construct our own realities, why can’t we
seem to construct a reality that makes us
happy?
Our theorizing is not utilitarian, nor do we
presuppose that the “facts” we describe are
valueless. Instead, we espouse a set of values
and the normative conclusions that arise from
those said and described facts, based upon
what we see as a chasm between “is” and
“ought.” We also believe that our facts (what
we know) already contain our values. We believe this is true of the entire academy, which
will make the quest to reclaim a greater presence with our vocations all that much more
difficult. Similar to pragmatists such as
Richard Rorty (1991), we believe there is a social construction to the knowledge in which
we live and work and that we have had a hand
in this construction. We also believe that this
is why the quest to reclaim a greater engagement with our vocations is even possible.
This stance, and the knowledge claims that
assess action in situ, is inherently ethical. The
stance is ethical because it recognizes and elevates human agency. Our desire to explain
might put us out of step with many colleagues,
but we believe that drawing word pictures of
the issues will help us understand our difficulties. Like Sokolowski (2000), we believe
that “the core doctrine in phenomenology is
the teaching that every act of consciousness
we perform and every experience that we have
is intentional: it is essentially ‘conscious of,’
or an ‘experience of’ something or other” (p.
8). We are then saying that intentional acts of
engagement will help us improve our work.
We are also saying that there is intentionality to the philosophies in which we engage. Intentionality is the general orientation of consciousness toward objects. Daniel Dennett
(1997) suggests that intentionality has an in-
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voluntary and we suggest learned (even
though that learning might remain unconscious) element. Intentionality is the way our
minds simply (and without conscious meaning
to) focus on the thousands of things that happen to us every day – the common ways we
live in our world.
Sokolowski (2000) suggests that involuntary
intentionality makes our minds “public,” because this intentionality connects us to things
in the social world and allows us to explore
how things are revealed to us in structures that
shape consciousness. In other words, what we
believe without conscious acts of the will essentially shapes how we react to our social
world. Going back to Whitehead (1925), these
are the things we take for granted. Our point is
that, if we engage the social world essentially
as victims (“acts that happen to humans”) and
things happen to us without connection to our
ability to shape them, the acridness of victimhood comes to overwhelm us in a deep psychological cynicism, from which there is no
escape and no rational choice except to become deeply unhappy.
Because we believe we socially construct
our world, the knowledge that proceeds from
construction always has intentionality. It
shapes us. In Thomistic terms, operation follows being.9 Our conscious actions originate
in our persons. Our being is needed because,
without it, we fall victim to the “subjectivism
and relativism” characterizing much of modern philosophy (Jeffreys, 2004, p. 42). This
subjectivism finds itself grounded in a sort of
solipsism of self-evident individuality. That is,
we live in a system that expects us to act, as
academics, for our selves in the business of
self-promotion and means that we act against
community and the agency of actions in those
communities. The system houses created rub9

Perhaps this point expresses the single point of difference in praxis from Christianity and Judaism, Islam, or Buddhism. Christianity posits that being
shapes actions; many other religious ideas focus less
on doctrine and more time on ritual or practice – believing that actions shape personhood.
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2
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rics (salary and promotions, star systems, research funds that seem finite, etc.) that promote these beliefs. So, we find ourselves, as
with others, both alone and cynical – two less
than joyful experiences. Compounding this
state of affairs is the issue of time. When we
come to feel alone, without hope of agency10
(cynical), and without time to change things or
think of how we might change things, we also
become desperately unhappy – a deeply personal emotion that seems to permeate our lives
as academics.
Not all philosophies lead to despair. Accepting that it is possible to live morally within a
place is a reinstatement of hope in agency and
in self-determination. As noted earlier, we are
not even saying that our analysis is “true;” we
are only saying that social constructing of
knowledge in one way (as opposed to the other) will make us happier. One “philosophy of
action” is found in Pope John Paul II’s work
(both as Pope John Paul II and as Karl Wojtyla). Pope John Paul II notes, “the moral life
consists of attaining the truth in all our actions
and behavior” (1993, p. 91). Pope John II
(1993) also notes that the “most evident feature in an act of will is the efficacy in the
awareness of the acting person in the act of
will” (p. 8).
For John Paul II, this self-determined will is
fundamental to ethical value and is the foundation of his “philosophy of action.” John Paul
II highlights the Thomist distinction between
“human acts” (acts we do with knowledge and
10

It is interesting to attend a conference and note
how derivative much of the work seems. That is,
there is what seems an excessive linking (a sort of
citation envy) to others’ (“key” thinkers’) work.
What becomes interesting is that ideas cited were actually original ideas – those cited had creative ideas,
but the presenters have not allowed themselves the
same activity. If Northrup Frye (Creation and Recreation, 1980) is correct, the human need to be creative
has been co-opted by a sort of jigsaw puzzling of other people’s pieces and ideas into an idea. Perhaps we
feel the inability to create and think for ourselves. If
so, to what effect? Once again, agency escapes our
work.
Fall 2008
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free will) and “acts of the human” (things that
simply happen to us) that we alluded to earlier. To expand, when something happens to
someone, there is no experience of efficacy –
no power. Only by altering one’s environment
(a transitive action), can one alter his or her
character (an intransitive action).
A dog might cover a bone and, by newly
creating a pile of dirt, cause a person to trip
and break an arm; but that dog can hardly be
said to be evil. On the other hand, a person
who literally shapes the physical world (for
example, working on a levee to thwart flooding) and, by doing so, reshapes dirt to save
lives can be said to be acting in kindness and
charity. That person is, according to John Paul
II, also reshaping his values and his person in
positive ways. The person has engaged in selfdetermining actions that are chosen because
they are valued; and, because he does, he has
become, as John Paul II (1993) notes, more of
a “somebody.” This act is willful, and this
“drama of the will” has been central to human
life throughout history and cultures (Wojtyla,
1993, p. 275). What one might expect a religious leader to say, perhaps; but, filled with
common sense to us.
In religious language, not surprisingly Catholic and Christian, John Paul II calls such actions “love.” And, whether talk of love in
philosophy makes one in the academy “goofy”
or not, for such a ubiquitous concept it has, as
Nota (1983, p. 195) notes, hardly been a topic
of 20th century philosophers. We find little has
changed in the 25 years since Nota made the
piercing diagnosis. Complexity speaks little of
love, or at least abstractly. Post-structural love
is absent.11 Freud might talk of love, but his
talk in our reading is biological and psychological – to be studied not experienced. The
people responsible for the discovery of the
double-helical structure of DNA in 1953 –
Francis Crick, Rosalind Franklin, Linus Pauling, James Watson and Maurice Wilkins –
11

As Slavoj Zizek (1997) has put it: “Love Thy
Neighbour? No thanks.”
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suggest that the body itself is a “lab” for
DNA. Where then is love here?
In this article, we have spoken about engagement, by which we mean being there with
and for others. We will speak only a bit about
love, since Pope John Paul II reminded us of
it. We start by suggesting that love, however,
is not so foreign to educational thought. It is
fundamentally embodied in the willful and
ethical actions of teachers toward students
and, in some ways, academics towards their
own areas of study as in “I love to read in my
area.” Something brought us to this place
where we (once) “loved” teaching or thinking
or researching or writing. There is an “opposite law to that of effort where effort may exhaust itself and come to rest, whereas love
either remains the same or increases” (Scheler,
1957, p. 158). In other words, we love those
things (especially teaching as a scholarship
among the professions) that we engage
without effort, although the things we love do
require work; but love shows itself in doing
what comes naturally for us to do. In all its
forms, love relates one to a “mutual relationship among persons.”
Teachers as Transformational Intellectuals
Perhaps those who have read much of Henry
Giroux will disagree, but we find Giroux’s
writing about teacher agency and educational reform hopeful. In many ways, Giroux’s
ideas coincide with our own ideas and we
give the reviewers of this article, in the spirit
of this project, full credit for their insights
into this matter. We have chosen to engage
Giroux’s work as a result of these reviewers’
suggestions. When Giroux wrote Teachers
As Intellectuals (1988), he began to apply
social theory to the everyday challenges of
schooling as a way to shape practical insights within the work of critical pedagogy.
In 1985 (a), Giroux wrote about teachers as
“transformative intellectuals.” And, al-
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though his writing is generally about K-12
teachers, his ideas speak to our work at the
academy. Giroux believes an educational
crisis exists that stems from the disempowerment of teachers at all levels and their
inability to shape the conditions of their
work. He critiques the “proletarianization”
of teacher work that reduces teachers to specialized technicians within a bureaucracy,
and defends teachers as transformative intellectuals whose scholarly practice is the service of educating thoughtful, active citizens.
Specifically, Giroux (1985b) notes the
threat of instrumental ideologies that emphasize a technocratic approach to teacher
work (we have noted this ideology in the
work of academics who publish specific articles for specific journals for the direct purposes of academic recognition, remuneration
and promotion). We agree with Giroux that
academics can become preoccupied with
“working the system” in technocratic and instrumental ways and, thus, in turn be worked
by the system. We suspect Giroux would
agree that, when the work of academics is
controlled and structured – for example in
formalized judgments of who gets rewarded
at the academy, work becomes slave to management techniques that eliminate critique
about how one lives and works within the
academy. As a result, the theoretical assumption that guides the behavior of academics is control toward shaping consistent,
predictable products. Thus, the deskilling of
academics undermines the potential for critical inquiry and engaged academic life –
what we believe Giroux calls in his writing
“citizenship.”
As a result, teaching, research and service
(the holy trinity of sorts) becomes depoliticized acts reduced to “getting ahead.” But
“getting ahead” means “falling behind”
when the effect is to deskill or remove academics from processes of deliberation and
reflection. More specifically, such actions
militate against the potential richness that
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2
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occurs when academics with different histories, experiences, ideas, cultures, and talents discuss together their work. In this context, although he was writing almost 25
years ago, Giroux argues that teachers must,
as “transformative intellectuals,” raise serious questions about what they teach, how
they teach, and the larger goals for which
they strive – including the purposes and conditions of the academy.
Central to becoming transformative intellectuals is to combine the pedagogical and
the political. This means making critical reflection and action part of a fundamental social project to help develop a deep and abiding faith in the struggle to overcome economic, political and social injustices, and to
further humanize ourselves for the struggle.
Giroux’s early 1980s rhetorical flair aside,
we believe such work has current value. We
disagree only with the extent to which
Giroux (1988) implies teachers (and we add
those within the academy) already are metacognitive about their own agency. He writes
as if teachers understand the hegemony in
which they live and work: we believe most
of us are less aware of this hegemony than
he credits. We also believe that, before we
can aid anyone else, we must address our
own agency. Only then can our teaching become political to the extent that it intervenes
in the ethical responsibility of incarnating
the idea exposed by Paulo Freire – that life
is conditioned but not determined.
Freire’s critical pedagogical practice did
not transfer knowledge but created possibilities, encouraged human agency, provided
conditions for self-determination, and
struggled for a society (and we add a culture) that is both autonomous and democratic. Thus, we return to our hopeful pedagogy
of engagement –what Giroux would call a
pedagogy that embodies emancipatory political interests that sees us all as critical
agents; that makes knowledge problematic;
that utilizes critical and affirming dialogue;
Fall 2008
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and that works for a qualitatively better
world. If Giroux is correct, and we believe
he is, transformative intellectuals seek to
“voice” learning by developing a critical
language that outlines the problems of
everyday life, particularly those related to
pedagogical experiences connected to educational practice.
We appreciate Giroux’s (2003) note that
transformative intellectuals must develop a
hopeful discourse that unites the language of
critique with the language of possibility, all
working toward the goal of change. Giroux
(2003) notes Judith Butler’s suggestion that,
for her, there is more hope in the world
when people question the taken for granted,
especially about their own humanity. Hope
links critical knowledge to democratic social
change, and allows us to engage in critique,
dialogue, and an open-ended struggle for social improvement.
Steps to Successful Pedagogies of Engagement
We offer, in its infancy, some suggestions
about how we as academics might overcome
our cynicism and lack of hope. Although we
have spent perhaps excessive time deconstructing what we have called a pedagogy of
disengagement, we will not speak so much
about how to beat out disengagement. Instead,
we will metaphorically accept and engage a
law of physics – two things may not occupy
the same space at the same time. We understand that there are flaws with this physical
metaphor, but in its infancy it seems fruitful.
In other words, we believe that filling our
lives with a pedagogy of engagement will naturally push away and ward off a pedagogy of
domination.
In addition to this posture, we acknowledge
and recognize those insights offered by reviewers of this article, who have engaged us in
the very discourse we seek about our work as
academics as well as what this article advoc-
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ates– the re-scripting of our work through dialogue. Our reviewers rightfully questioned the
simplistic nature of our naïve propositions.
And, we earlier acknowledged that we held
the naïve hope that this article might engender
further conversation about this important topic. Indeed, it has.
We acknowledge that this conversation is
longstanding; and, our inadvertent exclusion
of others directly engaged in examining how
academic work has changed over the past several decades is not to suggest that we have
claim to powerful new insights. Rather the opposite. We humbly recognize the work of other academics problematizing academic despair
and reformulating new visions as “purveyors
of warranted hope” (Walker, 2006). As authors, we think of the work of the American
Association of University Professors and other
organizations of comparable stature that are
addressing the issues posed in this article.
Our plan calls for a 14-Step Program that, as
imagined, does not cherish Step One of the
famous 12-Step Program that says “I accept
that I am not in control …” The steps are not
necessarily sequential but rather processural.
Step One: We acknowledge a profound
sense of our own good fortune and an active
gratitude for the opportunity we have as academics. We see our place in the academic life
as an unearned gift in the sense of an entitlement, and we accept that being an academic
carries a responsibility.
Step Two: We act with compassion towards
others. Compassion (from the Latin) means
“suffering with” – feeling empathy, identification, and sharing the experience of life with
those with whom we work.
Step Three: We actively “name” our oppositions to systemic domination, and by doing so
act in ways to move us towards justice (with
colleagues, for example, and for our students).
We seek to engage goals that promote working and learning in partnership or interdependence as opposed to independence. (As we
have done here together as authors and grate-
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fully utilizing the insights of our reviewers,
we must teach, research, write, and serve together.)
Step Four: Our work must emphasize engaged praxis, not intellectual piety. That is, we
accept the responsibility of an “ivory tower”
responsible to a culture and a society.
Step Five: We must talk more to each other.
Our impulse must be toward transformation
through dialogue – to help change those and
ourselves in pursuit of a better life.
Step Six: Our work must emphasize community (common unity). Community is inherently social and political, involving practices
such as demonstrating respect for each other,
responsibility and integrity in relationships,
and service.
Step Seven: We must engage in cooperative
acts committed to the long-term, with an active recognition that omni-competence is shortsighted. And, hard as it might be to do in a
system that actively prizes omni-competence,
we remain committed to working in partnerships and community even when the system
creates little space for these.
Step Eight: Individuals (including ourselves)
must be liberated (changed or transformed)
from inherent and violent patterns of selfseeking in their professional and ultimately
personal lives. This definition of violence includes all forms of deception, abuse, and manipulation of others for one’s own purposes.
Such violence stems from alienation and fear,
and is endemic to all humans and cultures –
including (perhaps especially) from those in
control who fear losing control.
Step Nine: We must act to remove fatalistic
traditions and actions that stifle or repress
hope and work to dismantle oppressive hierarchical social structures that create and maintain slavery and codependence. Teachers and
students alike must learn and practice self-respect and respect for others.
Step Ten: Activities that effectively improve
the quality of life for teachers and students
must be vigorously discussed and introduced.
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2
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The goals we seek must be “incarnated” in
ways students can understand. (All students,
we suggest, understand patience, truth, caring
actions, service, relationship, modesty, and respect.) We must engage students in open and
constant evaluation of those shared goals –
both as a way to improve our actions and as a
way to formulate our visions.
Step Eleven: We must forgive ourselves and
others when we all fail to live by an engaged
pedagogy and therefore ethically. Because we
are human, often our own perceived self-interest blocks our noble intentions and we are
guilty of self-centered thoughts and actions.
There are always frustrating constraints on individual efforts that seem to be self-defeating
even when well-intended. This “law of unintended effects” [the warning against disorder –
that almost any human action has unintended
consequences or unexpected results] reminds
us that, any time we do things, there may be
unforeseen effects and, as teachers, we must
beware – not so as to halt action but as to critique and evaluate our goals.
Step Twelve: We must not oversimplify the
complexity of social or institutional systems
and exalt an individual’s ability to triumph –
especially first attempts – against systematic
complexity. We know too well the deep nature
of systematic violence, the power of hegemony, and transformations of our own abilities to weigh actions. Even intents come slowly
and often amid much failure. We are all complicit with self-fulfilling presumptions that
govern our social institutions and condition us
as individuals.
Step Thirteen: We must understand that the
system constrains both the ‘rich’ and the
‘poor’ who inhabit that system. The only option for both seems to be to use the system to
“beat the system.” Our graduate students, for
example, come to jealously seek and even
emulate what seems to be our affluent, academic lifestyle – but, as noted by recent research that underscores the poverty of spirit
within the academy by pointing out how many
Fall 2008
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of us simply are unhappy in our work, we all
fall into a too-easy compliance with what is
basically an unjust system that exacerbates our
own – and ultimately – others’ poverty.
Step Fourteen: Finally, we must change our
orientation toward academic life and work.
For teachers and others, there has been a
lingering suspicion that too much emphasis on
theory might encourage and produce an affected piety without ethical action or without
obedience to our nobler intentions. We must
engage in praxis.
Conclusion
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle ~334323 BCE [1989] develops a theory of the good
life (eudiamonia) for humans. “Eudiamonia”
is perhaps best translated as flourishing or living well and doing well. So when Aristotle
speaks of the good life as the happy life, he
does not mean that the good life is merely one
of feeling happy or amused. Rather, the good
life for a person is the active life of functioning well in those ways that are essential and
unique to humans.
In this article, we have tried to make the
case that the culture of the academy is sick
and needs to be healed. As a result, those of us
who are living there are unhappy. The pervasive unhappiness is the result of a moral disease perpetrated by both the unconscious individual (the academic as person) and the
academy itself. Both parties are at fault. We
have pointed out some examples of this illness
– self-focus, lack of creativity, lack of community, conflicts over material resources,
deeply-embedded competition, deep cynicism,
and a lack of vision for positive change. We
are suggesting that the culture of the academy
can be reclaimed and have given some simple
examples of how that might be done on a personal and interpersonal level.
Although this article is only a beginning, we
hope that we might encourage a conversation
about our places of work, about our vocation,
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and about how we might flourish within institutional spaces of teaching learning and knowledge creation. We appreciate the attention our
work has been given by reviewers charged
with reading and evaluating this work towards
its inclusion in a refereed journal. Although
we wish to engage the hearts and minds of our
readers with the possibility of a new way of
doing our work and the “reclamation of lost
ideals,” as one of our reviewers has suggested,
our suggestions for systemic change are limited to simple, although not simplistic, suggestions. We believe that any change must be cultural change – this includes changing our (1)
language – the way we talk to each other and
the words we use, (2) values and worldviews –
not focusing on lesser values that are material
but, instead, focusing on higher values, (3) our
norms – the rules we have that help us relate
to each other and the material world, (4) the
way we live and behave – so as to build and
sustain community, and (5) the way we create
and use artifacts – building and creating “tools
for conviviality.”
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